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Evidence will be reviewed suggesting a fairly direct link between the human 
ability to think about entities which one has never perceived — here called 
‘cognition by description’ — and procedural memory. Cognition by 
description is a uniquely hominid trait which makes religion, science, and 
history possible. It is hypothesized that cognition by description (in the 
manner of Bertrand Russell’s ‘knowledge by description’) requires variable 
binding, which in turn utilizes quantifier raising. Quantifier raising plau-
sibly depends upon the computational core of language, specifically the 
element of it which Noam Chomsky calls ‘internal Merge’. Internal Merge 
produces hierarchical structures by means of a memory of derivational 
steps, a process plausibly involving procedural memory. The hypothesis is 
testable, predicting that procedural memory deficits will be accompanied by 
impairments in cognition by description. We also discuss neural mecha-
nisms plausibly underlying procedural memory and also, by our hypothesis, 
cognition by description. 
 
 
Keywords: basal ganglia; cerebellum; cognition by description; knowledge 
by description; language evolution; procedural memory; theory 
of descriptions 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
We review evidence suggesting a fairly direct link between the human ability to 
think about entities which one has never perceived, what we call ‘cognition by 
description’,1 and procedural memory. The discussion is exploratory and its 
conclusions are tentative, but we submit that evident links between specific 
forms of uniquely human cognition and procedural memory merit attention. 
                                                
      For helpful comments on an earlier draft and/or email exchanges on pertinent topics, we 
would like to thank Noam Chomsky, Ayşe Elif Erson, Daniel Everett, Andrew Nevins, 
Steven Pinker, Üner Tan, Michael Ullman, and two anonymous referees for this journal. 
Any remaining deficiencies are due to the authors alone. 
    1 We use the term ‘cognition by description’ — instead of Russell’s (1910) term ‘knowledge by 
description’ — because knowledge is often taken to involve justification and hence to have 
normative implications (Kim 1993: chap. 12). Since our aim is scientific, we choose a purely 
descriptive term. 
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2. Cognition by Description and Merge 
 
Non-humans give no evidence of being able to think about fictional characters or 
entities which they have never perceived, such as electrons or Poseidon or the 
children of one’s unborn children. Instead, one finds a one-to-one mapping 
between a brain process and some property in the environment (Gallistel 1990). 
In spoken remarks (Chomsky 2006), Noam Chomsky has reflected on how this 
differs from the semantics of human mental systems: 
 
The concepts and words that [humans] have do not pick out entities in the 
world that, say, a physicist could identify, that can be found by mind-
external investigation. But, rather, they are basically products of the 
imagination. […] The formal concept of reference that you study in logic, 
that’s developed by Frege, Peirce, Tarski, Carnap, and so on -— it just 
doesn’t apply to natural language. […] Human language and thought just 
don’t have […] terms that pick out pieces of the world. This appears to be a 
respect in which humans differ sharply from any other organism. As far as 
is known, animal communication systems are based on […] an isomorphism 
between some internal symbol and some identifiable aspect of the world. 
[…] Looking at the vervet monkey anthropomorphically, the way we look at 
everything, we say that the monkey is giving this call because there’s an 
eagle there, and it’s telling the rest of the crew of monkeys to run away. 
What appears to be happening [however] is that there’s a reflexive reaction 
to some, say, motion of leaves or something like that, and then the call 
comes out. There’s apparently an identifiable isomorphic relation between 
the call and a physically identifiable aspect of the environment. […] That 
appears to be the case for all animal communication systems, as far as 
anyone’s discovered. If that’s the case, then one fundamental difference 
between humans and the rest of the organic world is that we have concepts 
that do not pick out mind-independent entities. 
 
How can humans use symbols, ultimately mental symbols, to indicate things in 
one’s ‘subjective universe’, as it is sometimes called?  
 This ability should not be equated with displaced reference. A typical 
definition of displaced reference would be “the ability to refer to information that 
is spatially and temporally displaced from the location of the speaker and the 
listener” (Morford & Goldin-Meadow 1997: 420). But this definition doesn’t 
distinguish referring to entities that one perceived earlier, but which are not 
currently present, from the designation of entities that one has never perceived. 
There is an important difference between seeing a red ball, leaving the room so 
that one no longer sees it, and then referring to the red ball; as opposed to 
referring to the children of one’s unborn children. There is also the ability to talk 
and think about entities which do not even exist. Strictly speaking, this is not 
reference at all, but it is a sophisticated semantic ability nonetheless. 
 In this article we are concerned with what appears to be a uniquely human 
ability, namely the ability to talk and think about entities which one has never 
perceived and which, in some cases, do not exist. This is what we call ‘cognition 
by description’, a naturalized variant of Bertrand Russell’s knowledge by 
description (Russell 1910, 1959). Chomsky has suggested that a computational 
operation could explain this uniquely human ability (Hauser et al. 2002, Chomsky 
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2005, 2006, 2007). In other words, the evolution of a recursive procedure, in 
conjunction with whatever mental apparatus was already there,2 resulted in 
cognition by description.  
 Derek Bickerton, however, insists that the mere addition of recursion in 
hominid evolution is not enough to explain this sophisticated capacity.  
 
Those [semantic] properties, as [Chomsky] quite correctly states, are pre-
cisely the properties that distinguish human concepts from the concepts of 
other species — they refer to mental constructs rather than natural objects. 
But if concepts with such properties are unique to human language, how 
could recursion have applied to them when language did not yet exist? Either those 
concepts (and probably the words with which they were linked) already 
existed, implying some kind of system intermediate between animal 
communication and true language, or recursion could not […] have applied 
to anything. Since syntactic language now exists, it is a logically unavoidable 
conclusion that there must have been some kind of protolanguage before 
recursion.       (Bickerton 2005: 3, emphasis in the original) 
 
Not surprisingly, Bickerton takes the following two issues in language evolution 
to be fundamentally distinct: 
 
(1) How did symbolic units (words or manual signs) evolve? 
(2) How did syntax evolve? 
 Symbolic units and syntax are the only real novelties in human 
communication, and are therefore the most salient (as well as the most 
difficult) of the things any adequate theory of language evolution must 
account for. There is no reason to believe that the emergence of the two was 
either simultaneous or due to similar causes, and some good reasons for 
supposing the contrary. Chomsky (1980) has made a clear distinction 
between the conceptual and the computational aspects of language. The 
conceptual element, especially if we take it to include conceptual structure 
as well as the lexical instantiation of the latter, must be phylogenetically far 
older than any computational mechanism.    (Bickerton 2007: 511)3 
 
 Contra Bickerton, we wish to show how the addition of a specific recursive 
operation could transform a system of mental symbols which are referential in 
the manner of, say, vervet communication systems, into a symbol system suitable 
for cognition by description. It is not necessary to posit an a-grammatic 
protolanguage, the concepts of which made possible cognition by description, 
prior to the evolution of uniquely human computational abilities. In other words, 
Bickerton’s (1) and (2) may be far more tightly intertwined than he recognizes, 
where the “symbols” in his (1) designate entities in one’s ‘subjective universe’. 
Contrary to Bickerton, adding the right sort of computations to a purely referen-
                                                
    2 “In conjunction with whatever mental apparatus was already there” is an important quali-
fication. In discussing this topic, people sometimes forget that it is a necessary condition that 
is at issue, not a sufficient one. This is why a condition, such as Williams syndrome 
(Karmiloff–Smith 1992, Smith 2004), in which mental retardation is accompanied by sophis-
ticated syntax is not a counterexample to the hypothesis of this paper. 
    3 One can recognize the distinction between conceptual and computational systems, while 
acknowledging that one system uses symbols generated by the other.  
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tialist system can yield a mind capable of cognition by description.4 All the really 
heavy lifting here, in fact, was done by Russell (1905, 1919) in his theory of 
descriptions and his closely related work on knowledge by description (Russell 
1910, 1959), and also by Chomsky (1976) in his work on trace theory. We try to 
show here how Russell’s insights can be extended to questions of human 
cognitive evolution.5  
 In doing so, we assume that the computational core of language plays a 
large role in uniquely human cognition generally, a simpler hypothesis than 
positing one recursive system for language and a separate one for belief-forming 
systems. This working hypothesis suggests a working methodology, namely to 
investigate syntactic computations as a means of understanding uniquely human 
concepts. It wouldn’t hurt to emphasize this working methodology, and to write 
it out as a principle: 
 
So far as possible, seek explanations of uniquely human concepts in terms of 
syntactic computations.  
 
A classic example of the application of this methodology would be Chomsky’s 
attempt to understand unbounded counting in terms of syntax (Hauser et al. 
2002, Chomsky 2005), to which we return later. 
 Russell’s theory of descriptions is often understood as a theory about the 
logical form of sentences containing determiner phrases (Neale 1990).6 Logical 
form is here defined as “whatever features of sentence structure (1) enter directly 
into semantic interpretation of sentences and (2) are strictly determined by 
properties of (sentence-) grammar” (Chomsky 1976: 305-306).7  
 Russell was especially concerned with the logical form of sentences 
containing determiner phrases which designate at most one thing; for example, 
such phrases as the inventor of the telegraph, the author of De Legibus, Whistler’s 
mother, and my favorite book. This class of determiner phrases also includes 
phrases which designate at most one type of thing, such as the element with atomic 
number 1. These phrases are known as ‘definite descriptions’. Russell (1905, 1919) 
was concerned to show that sentences containing definite descriptions, which we 
                                                
    4 This would imply that humans and non-human primates both utilize symbols, ‘primitives’, 
with referentialist semantics. This disagrees with Chomsky’s (2007: 20) remark that “even 
the simplest words and concepts of human language and thought lack the relation to mind-
independent entities that has been reported for animal communication”. But it is not clear 
how Chomsky means to defend such a sweeping claim. Our proposal is that, while humans 
and other primates share a referentialist semantic system, humans alone enjoy a recursively 
generated semantics which draws its primitives from that referentialist system.  
    5 In doing so, we take no stand on the metaphysical issues which concerned Russell, such as 
sense-datum theory, logical data, etc. 
    6 An alternative would be to interpret Russell’s theory as concerned with an ideal or perfect 
language, as opposed to natural language. Russell was not always consistent on this point, 
but he sometimes explicitly denied any interest in natural language: “My theory of 
descriptions was never intended as an analysis of the state of mind of those who utter 
sentences containing descriptions” (Russell 1957: 388). But if the theory of descriptions can 
be given a testable formulation and is shown to have explanatory power, e.g., in accounting 
for human uniqueness, than it deserves to be taken seriously as a scientific hypothesis about 
the human mind.   
    7 This is Chomsky’s definition of ‘LF’. How precisely Russell’s own notion of logical form 
overlaps and contrasts with LF will not be discussed.  
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will call ‘definites’, implicitly feature bound variables. Using a simpli-fied 
example, the logical form of the definite The author of De Legibus was Roman 
would be [There is a unique x, such that x wrote De Legibus] and [For all x, if x wrote 
De Legibus then x was Roman]. The logical form more abstractly stated would be 
[There is a unique x, such that Lx] and [for all x if Lx then Rx], where L and R are 
predicates. The semantic interpretation could be expressed as Whatever unique 
thing wrote De Legibus, that thing was Roman.   
 According to Russell’s (1910, 1959) theory of knowledge by description, the 
ability to have thoughts of the form [There is a unique x, such that Lx] and [for all x 
if Lx then Rx] makes it possible to think about things one has never perceived. For 
example, one can think about the author of De Legibus, namely Cicero, by 
forming quantified mental representations even if one had never met him. This is 
because the use of quantification can restrict the extension of a predicate to at 
most one individual thus forming a predicate which can do much of the semantic 
work that would otherwise be done by a proper name. Russell was, at least 
implicitly, following our working methodology, since he submitted that the 
logical form of definites also enters into knowledge by description. In other 
words, the operator-variable structures which figure into language also figure in 
the formation of thoughts about unobserved things. Analogously, we suggest 
that bound variables play a crucial role in cognition by description, such as one’s 
beliefs about Cicero. This is simpler than supposing that the mind reinvents the 
wheel, so to speak, by generating operator-variable structures for language and 
then generating them separately, and all over again, for the belief systems.  
 To illustrate, suppose that an early hominid discovers an artifact in the 
forest, say, a stone tool. Let’s suppose that this hominid uses the sort of mental 
symbol system that plausibly characterizes vervet monkeys, so that the system’s 
semantics is limited to objects of immediate experience. The hominid thinks 
about the tool only by reason of “a reflexive reaction”, to use Chomsky’s phrase. 
In other words, there is a fairly direct causal link between the presence of the tool 
and the tokening of the relevant mental symbol. Now let us also suppose that the 
maker of the tool died long before its discoverer was born, and no bodily remains 
of that maker are anywhere to be found nearby. Given a system of mental 
representation limited to currently existing entities — essentially a reflex — the 
discoverer might be able to think about the tool but not about its maker.  
 But we know that that’s not what actually happens, at least not for Homo 
sapiens. The Homo sapiens can think about the maker of the tool without 
needing to perceive that maker. How is this possible? Russell suggested that one 
uses definite descriptions. Since a definite description is implicitly a quantifier 
phrase, the quantifier operator restricts the extension of the relevant predicate so 
that it is satisfied by at most one individual or set of individuals singled out by 
their shared properties, the resulting expression being equivalent, for practical 
purposes, to a symbol for an unperceived entity or type of thing. To return to the 
example of the hominid encountering the stone tool; s/he could designate the 
long dead maker of the tool by forming a mental representation with the logical 
form there is a unique x, such that x made this tool.  
 Note that Russell was suggesting that one uses the product of language, 
namely a definite description, in mental operations that one would not intuitively 
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think of as linguistic. To use the terminology of modularity theory (Fodor 1983), 
one uses representations generated by the language faculty to form represen-
tations in the belief systems. This explanation is more economical than proposing 
two distinct systems for generating operator–variable structures, and thus agrees 
with our working methodology.8   
 From a Russellian perspective, adding variable binding to an otherwise 
referentialist symbol system would suffice for definite descriptions and hence 
knowledge by description. Therefore, if the addition of a recursive procedure can 
make possible variable binding, then one would have to disagree with Bickerton 
when he says that one cannot account for the evolution of cognition by 
description by appealing to the evolution of a recursive procedure. So can the 
mere addition of a recursive procedure explain variable binding? To answer the 
question, let’s consider what sort of recursive procedure Chomsky has in mind in 
the first place.  
 In this procedure, known as Merge, two objects are combined such that one 
alone is the ‘head’, determining the resultant object’s combinatorial properties 
(Chomsky 2005, 2007). The resulting compound can then be merged with another 
object to yield a more complex compound with a new head. And so on. This 
makes possible the recursive embedding of an object within an object of the same 
type, such as a verb phrase within a verb phrase.  
 For example, for can be merged with mercy to yield a PP: 
 
(1) [PP for mercy ] 
 
For is the head, since it determines that the phrase is a Preposition Phrase, rather 
than being a Noun Phrase. The grammatical category of the phrase determines 
how it can combine with other objects. If it were a Noun Phrase, it would appear 
in different grammatical contexts. Note that this result of Merge can itself be 
merged with plead to form the Verb Phrase: 
 
(2) [VP plead [PP for mercy ]] 
 
This VP can be merged with to thus forming the Infinitive Phrase: 
 
(3) [IP to [VP plead [PP for mercy ]]] 
 
This IP can further be merged to the verb refuse yielding the next VP: 
 
(4) [VP refuse [IP to [VP plead [PP for mercy ]]]] 
 
And so on.  
                                                
    8 An anonymous referee suggested that our hypothesis is committed to there being an 
implausible isomorphism between language and the systems of belief, specifically that 
language produces belief structures and that the belief systems produce syntactic structures. 
To the contrary, we posit a division of labor and hence a crucial difference between these 
two faculties. One would be crippled without the other precisely because they are not 
isomorphic.  
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 We see here an illustration of recursion, in this case the inclusion of a Verb 
Phrase in a Verb Phrase. The result of this repeated use of Merge is a hierarchical 
structure in which one phrase dominates another which dominates another, in 
this case terminating with the domination of for and mercy.9 There is evidence 
that language has hierarchical phrase structure (Miller 1962, Miller & Isard 1963, 
Epstein 1961a, 1961b, Fodor & Bever 1965, Johnson 1965, Graf & Torrey 1966, 
Mehler et al. 1967, Anglin & Miller 1968, Levelt 1970). Furthermore, positing a 
recursive operation is unavoidable in explaining how finite resources can 
potentially generate an infinite number of hierarchically ordered structures 
composed of discrete elements (Turing 1950, Boolos et al. 2002). 
 Merge can only take two forms: Either an object O is merged to an object 
which is a constituent of O or O is merged to an object which is not a constituent 
of O — internal Merge and external Merge, respectively (Chomsky 2005). The 
earlier example of Merge, illustrated in refuse to plead for mercy, was external. 
What about internal Merge? Consider the phrase Socrates thought what. Merging 
what with Socrates thought what to yield what Socrates thought what is an example of 
internal Merge, because what was already a constituent of Socrates thought what. 
The resulting four-part phrase what Socrates thought what would not be fully 
pronounced. But semantically, all four elements are interpreted, the first what as 
an operator and the second what as the variable it binds.10 In other words, the 
semantic interpretation would be for which thing x, Socrates thought x, pronounced 
in English as ‘What Socrates thought’.  
 
[A]s a simple matter of logic, there are two kinds of Merge, external and 
internal. External Merge takes two objects, say eat and apples, and forms the 
new object that corresponds to eat apples. Internal Merge — often called 
Move — is the same, except that one of the objects is internal to the other. So 
applying internal Merge to John ate what, we form the new object 
corresponding to what John ate what, … . [A]t the semantic interface, both 
occurrences of what are interpreted: The first occurrence as an operator and 
the second as the variable over which it ranges, so that the expression means 
something like for which thing x, John ate the thing x. At the sensorimotor side, 
only one of the two identical syntactic objects is pronounced, typically the 
structurally most salient occurrence.        (Chomsky 2007: 21) 
 
Internal Merge generally creates operator–variable structures (Chomsky 1976).  
 Chomsky (2005) argues for Merge by noting that the arrangement of 
discrete elements into a potential infinitude of hierarchical structures requires a 
combinatorial operation. Given that Merge as such is a recursive operation and 
that internal Merge accounts for bound variables, one can begin to see how 
recursion could figure into ‘definites’ (i.e. sentences containing definite 
descriptions) and hence cognition by description, as per our working metho-
dology.  
 More needs to be said as to exactly how internal Merge figures into 
                                                
    9 This process is indifferent between synthesis and analysis. Syntax merely distinguishes 
grammatical from ungrammatical structures, it is not specifically a sentence producing 
process. For some early (pre-Merge) discussion of this, see Chomsky (2002: 48).  
    10 By copying what into a superordinate position, it binds the unspoken what in the subordi-
nate position, according to the c-command condition on binding (Reinhart 1976).  
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definites, but before doing so, we need to reflect further on the nature of 
definites. Here we follow Larson & Segal’s (1998: 247f.) analysis of quantified 
sentences including definites. A quantified sentence is analyzable into three 
elements:  
 
(5) a. A quantification stating how many are involved, e.g., all. In the case 
of a definite, the quantifier states that at most one is involved, e.g., the. 
 b. A restriction stating the class of entities involved, e.g., mice.  
 c. A scope stating what is true of the individuals in the restriction, e.g., 
being mortal. 
 
In All mice are mortal, all expresses quantification, mice expresses the restriction, 
and are mortal expresses the scope. It will be seen that internal Merge plays a role 
in distinguishing restriction from scope in sentences containing determiner 
phrases, including definites. 
 Many linguists today agree with Russell that the use of definites involves 
operator–variable structures at the level of logical form,11 although the Russellian 
approach to such structures has been amended somewhat (Keenan & Stavi 1986, 
Neale 1990, Larson & Segal 1998). While Russell used the unary quantifiers 
introduced by Frege, it is more plausible that determiners in natural languages 
are binary; that all, for example, is a relational predicate whose arguments are 
two sets. For example, the all in All mice are mortal expresses a relation between 
the set of mice and the set of mortals. But this approach to determiners is still 
Russellian in an important respect; namely, it still involves bound variables. 
Furthermore, the bound variables that figure into sentences using determiners 
are plausibly due to a sub-case of internal Merge known as ‘quantifier raising’ 
(see Larson & Segal 1998, Hornstein & Uriagereka 1999 for recent discussion). 
Given our working methodology, this means that it is a plausible hypothesis that 
quantifier raising plays a crucial role in cognition by description.  
 According to recent semantic theory (supra), two different sorts of Merge 
must occur so as to distinguish restriction from scope. Consider the logical form 
of All mice are mortal and how it is produced. All is externally Merged to mice so 
that mice serves as the restriction. But an internal Merge operation must be 
performed so that being mortal will serve as scope. Internal Merge establishes 
relations of scope, in the case of quantification, by producing bound variables. 
More specifically, all mice initially occurs as the complement of mortal and is then 
internally merged in a higher position (i.e. ‘raised’) leaving an unpronounced 
variable as the complement of mortal, namely mortal x. The result of this quanti-
                                                
    11 Donnellan (1966, 1968) argues that there is a ‘referential use’ of definite descriptions such 
that a definite need not contain a bound variable (see also Devitt 2004). This is often taken as 
“an attack on Russell”, but Donnellan is only saying that Russell’s theory of descriptions 
doesn’t fully generalize. Donnellan never denied that definites sometimes conceal operator-
variable structures as revealed on a semantic analysis. This would be the case for the ‘attri-
butive use’ of definites. So, even if Donnellan is right, it does not mean that the semantic 
analyses of this paper are wrong. It would just mean that they are only true of a specific use 
of definites. That ‘attributive use’ would employ the same computational procedures (e.g., 
internal Merge) which enter into cognition by description.  
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fier raising is that the set of mortal things becomes the scope of the expression. 
Using Neale’s (1990) notation, ‘[all x: mice x] (mortal x)’ is a good expression of 
the logical form of All mice are mortal; ‘all x’ must be raised to a superordinate 
position in order to bind the variable in ‘mortal x’.12 Let’s consider an example of 
a definite, namely, The maker of this arrowhead was skilled. Ignoring tense, the 
logical form is more revealing notated as follows: [the x: make this arrowhead x] 
(skilled x). The variable appearing in ‘(skilled x)’ is bound by the operator as a 
result of quantifier raising, the set of skilled things thus serving as the scope.  
 If internal Merge is necessary for cognition by description does it follow 
that internal Merge is also necessary for formulating counterfactuals or questions 
at the level of thought? Not necessarily. In the case of counterfactuals and 
questions, all that is needed is the ability to combine meaningful units in various 
different ways. Assume that Socrates, Thrasymachus, and kissing are objects of 
immediate awareness. One should be able to form the thought Socrates kissed 
Thasymachus, even if it is a false thought, simply by combining the relevant 
meaningful units so as to yield the representation Socrates kissed Thasymachus. 
This would not be cognition by description, but it would be counterfactual.13 One 
should also be able to formulate the query Did Socrates kiss Thrasymachus? by 
forming the representation Socrates kissed Thasymachus and then adding the con-
ceptual element of interrogation.14   
 As briefly noted earlier, there is a precedent for attempting to explain 
uniquely human cognitive abilities in syntactic terms in Chomsky’s (2005) 
suggestion that unbounded counting results from Merge. As Noam Chomsky 
(p.c.) puts it, “[t]here are a number of ways of deriving the number system from 
Merge. To take one, assume that the lexicon has a single member, call it 1, and 
accept the convention that {X} = X. Then 1 = {1}. Internal Merge yields {1, {1}}. 
Call it 2. Etc. Addition and other operations follow pretty simply”. This agrees 
with our working methodology. 
 
 
3. Unique to Humans? 
 
In the past few years, there has been much discussion as to whether recursion in 
cognitive processes is unique to humans (Hauser et al. 2002, Pinker & Jackendoff 
2005, Parker 2006) or whether a specific recursive procedure, such as Merge, is 
unique to humans (Chomsky 2005). The debate is relevant here because we want 
to know which is the more plausible hypothesis: Did the evolution of Merge as 
such usher in cognition by description, or was it specifically the evolution of 
internal Merge? Or maybe even just quantifier raising? If Merge-like procedures 
are found in other species, but without evidence of internal Merge, this would be 
                                                
    12 Raising is necessary for binding because of the c-command condition. 
    13 Note that Russell’s knowledge by description, even though it involves knowledge of some 
truths, still counts as knowledge of things. For Russell (1959: 46f.), I have knowledge by de-
scription of, say, Socrates and Thrasymachus, but I do not have knowledge by description, 
say, that Socrates pitied Thrasymachus.   
    14 This may not be the same as forming the sentence Did Socrates kiss Thrasymachus? which 
evidently does require internal Merge, at least in English, with the unspoken trace of did 
following Socrates.   
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relevant. The debate concerning whether or not recursion is unique to humans, 
and the closely related question of whether or not hierarchically structured 
mental representations are unique to humans, remain very much alive (Gibson 
1993, Byrne & Russon 1998, Spinozzi et al. 1999, Bergman et al. 2003, McGonigle et 
al. 2003, Fitch & Hauser 2004, Suzuki et al. 2006). 
 Here is one example of the debate: Some scientists have argued that the 
European starling can parse recursively center-embedded structures. Starlings 
can be trained to behave as though they have internalized rules of the form anbn 
as applied to the chirps and warbles they are familiar with from their own songs, 
at least when n=2 (Gentner et al. 2006). Does this mean that they are parsing 
structures of the form [A[AB]B] in which there is an AB recursively nested in 
another token of AB? In other words, does it mean that we find here the 
computational power minimally required for a context-free grammar as Timothy 
Gentner concludes? Not necessarily. According to Chomsky, the conclusion of 
Gentner and his colleagues “is based on an elementary mathematical error” 
(quoted in Goudarzi 2006). He adds that the birds’ behavior “has nothing 
remotely to do with language; probably just with short-term memory”. In other 
words, the starlings could be employing a non-recursive device for counting 
chirps and warbles. The bird could be counting two chirps, storing the result in 
memory, and then checking to see if the warbles also equal two.15 This need only 
bestow on them the computational power of a finite-state automaton with 
counters (Chomsky 1959: 151), a non-recursive machine.  
 We do not take a position as to whether recursion is unique to humans. But 
we do hypothesize that (at least) internal Merge is unique to humans, and that 
this explains why cognition by description is only found among them. In fact, the 
limitation of cognition by description to humans is evidence for the limitation of 
internal Merge to humans. (When we say ‘humans’, we are not excluding other 
extinct hominid species; we take no stand on whether, say, Neanderthals utilized 
internal Merge.) 
 Hypothesizing that internal Merge is unique to humans leaves open the 
question of whether or not external Merge is as well. Fitch et al. (2005: 186-187) 
have considered the possibility that navigation in some nonhuman species 
employs a combinatorial computational procedure which is very much like exter-
nal Merge. To give an example, an animal may be able to remember the location 
of its home by means of a mental representation that would be well expressed in 
English as [[[[the hole] in the ground] near the tree] by the lake]’, exhibiting a nested 
structure analogous to [refuse [to [plead [for mercy]]]] and also exhibiting compo-
sitionality, an important feature of Merge. But note that internal Merge is not 
required to form this specific mental representation. There is a tendency for 
linguists working in the minimalist paradigm to treat internal and external forms 
of Merge as necessarily both being utilizable by a mind if either is (Berwick 1998). 
But, given that internal Merge requires a more developed procedural memory 
system than does external Merge alone, as we will discuss in the next section, it 
should come as no surprise that a mind may utilize the external form only. 
                                                
    15 See Pinker & Jackendoff (2005, fn. 10) for a similar criticism, albeit directed against Fitch & 
Hauser (2004). 
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4. Internal Merge and Types of Memory 
 
Internal Merge is tantamount to what is often called ‘syntactic movement’ or just 
‘movement’. This is because internal Merge does look like the rearrangement of 
parts, if one focuses on phonology alone. For example, in the case of internally 
merging what with Socrates thought what, it looks as though what moves from the 
end of the structure to its beginning, a transformation of a more basic structure. 
Syntactic movement respects parts of speech and phrase structure; i.e. it is 
‘structure-dependent’ meaning that part of speech and phrasal location are 
crucial in determining which object is moved. In The dog who dug there was 
growling, it is possible to move was to the front yielding Was the dog who dug there 
growling?. But dug cannot be moved to the front. So *Dug the dog who there was 
growling?, despite its lovely poetic meter, is ungrammatical. Not only is it the 
case that one can only move a verb in English question formation, it also matters 
which clause the verb appears in prior to movement. It is the auxiliary verb in the 
main clause which moves. Given poverty-of-the-stimulus evidence collected by 
Stromswold (1999), the structure dependency of movement seems to be innate, 
and hence an invariant feature of language.  
 To know how a sentence is divided into phrases, and the parts of speech of 
its elements, is to remember something about how it was constructed, i.e. how 
objects were merged together to form this complex object, this sentence. To 
know, for example, that The dog who dug there was growling contains a sub-clause, 
and where that sub-clause begins and ends, is to remember that The dog who dug 
there was growling was put together out of simpler parts and to remember 
something about what the parts of speech of those parts were at each step in the 
derivation. Also to know that was is here an auxiliary verb is to know something 
about how the parts of the sentence were put together. A mapping from one 
derivational step to the next, when movement is involved, “rearranges the 
elements of the string to which it applies, and it requires considerable 
information about the constituent structure of this string” (Chomsky 1956: 121). 
This information is tantamount to a memory of derivational steps, what is 
sometimes called ‘derivational memory’. In other words, internal Merge requires 
derivational memory (Piattelli–Palmarini & Uriagereka 2005: 53f.). If cognition by 
description involves quantifier raising and quantifier raising is a sub-case of internal 
Merge, then cognition by description requires derivational memory. 
 We need to reflect on some more general features of memory before 
returning to the discussion of the specific memory demands of internal Merge. 
When the word ‘memory’ is used in everyday language, it is usually declarative 
memory that is meant; i.e. the conscious recollection of facts and events. There 
are also unconscious, evidently, non-declarative memory systems too (Squire 
2004). The form of non-declarative memory of special interest in understanding 
the structure-dependency of internal Merge is procedural memory, namely the 
sort of memory implicated 
 
in the learning of the new, and the control of long-established, motor and 
cognitive ‘skills’, ‘habits’, and other procedures, such as typing, riding a 
bicycle, and skilled game playing […]. The [procedural] system underlies 
aspects of rule-learning […], and is particularly important for acquiring and 
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performing skills involving sequences — whether the sequences are serial or 
abstract, or sensori-motor or cognitive […]. It is commonly referred to as an 
implicit memory system because both the learning of the procedural 
memories and the memories themselves are generally not available to 
conscious access. 
(Ullman & Pierpont 2005: 401; emphasis added — JB, BE & CK) 
 
 How might this relate to language? Linguistic mappings of sounds onto 
meanings can be divided into the idiosyncratic and the principled. For example, 
refuse to plead for mercy is mapped onto its semantic content in a principled way 
because its meaning is a function of the meanings of its parts and their manner of 
combination. That’s compositionality. The same cannot be said for kick the bucket 
when used as an idiom. One must memorize the meaning of the latter, rather 
than constructing it from its parts.16 Michael Ullman and his colleagues 
hypothesize that principled mappings utilize the procedural memory system, 
while idiosyncratic mappings utilize declarative memory, what is known as the 
‘declarative/procedure model’ (Ullman & Gopnik 1994, Pinker & Ullman 2002, 
Ullman 2004, Ullman & Pierpont 2005, Newman et al. 2007). In terms of 
Chomsky’s linguistics, this would mean that Merge requires procedural memory, 
whereas lexical pairings of sound and meaning utilize declarative memory. 
 Part of what recommends Ullman’s hypothesis is its accounting for the 
otherwise mysterious range of disabilities associated with Specific Language 
Impairment (SLI), “a developmental disorder of language in the absence of frank 
neurological damage, hearing deficits, severe environmental deprivation, or 
mental retardation” (Ullman & Pierpont 2005: 399). The authors note that, in 
addition to difficulties in grammar, those with SLI exhibit impairments in motor 
skills, working memory, and word retrieval. This cluster of symptoms could be 
explained in terms of a deficit in procedural memory. The hypothesis is further 
recommended by the fact that disorders involving impairment of procedural 
memory are accompanied by grammatical difficulties, while disorders involving 
declarative memory are accompanied by lexical difficulties (Ullman 2004). It has 
also been hypothesized that a role for the FOXP2 gene in procedural memory 
may explain why a defect in that gene results in grammatical difficulties (Ullman 
& Pierpont 2005, Piattelli–Palmarini & Uriagereka 2005), a basal ganglia abnor-
mality being implicated (Watkins et al. 2002). 
 The procedural/declarative hypothesis is controversial. Some have argued 
that the evidence favors a single-mechanism model (Bird et al. 2003, Joanisse & 
Seidenberg 1999, McClelland & Patterson 2002, Longworth et al. 2005). Newman 
et al. (2007: 436) conclude that “the issue is still open, and further evidence is 
necessary to help constrain the range of possible theoretical interpretations”. The 
procedural/declarative model is assumed here for the sake of developing a 
hypothesis to test. 
 The structure of a phrase involves an abstract sequencing insofar as it 
exhibits hierarchical relations, as illustrated earlier by the example refuse to plead 
for mercy. So, on Ullman’s model, Merge requires procedural memory. This point 
                                                
    16 Although it is principled to the extent that one can say kicks the bucket or kicked the bucket, 
and so on. 
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is essentially the same as that made by Ullman & Pierpont (2005) in their dis-
cussion of ‘rule governed’ syntax. But note that Piattelli–Palmarini & Uriagereka 
(2005) point out that derivational memory, discussed above, is also plausibly 
procedural since it is a kind of sequence memory. Memory of derivational steps 
is a memory of the order in which objects were merged together and which parts 
of speech those objects were. So internal Merge should place even greater demands on 
procedural memory than external Merge alone. External Merge alone involves 
hierarchical relations, but internal Merge also requires a memory of the steps 
taken in forming such relations (Chomsky 2002: 37). The role of procedural 
memory in internal Merge means that cognition by description places a heavy 
demand on procedural memory. 
 But what of the remark one sometimes hears in linguistics that internal 
Merge ‘comes for free’? Does this contradict the point just made? What does it 
mean to say that internal Merge ‘comes for free’? Let’s turn to some pertinent 
literature. 
 Joseph Aoun and colleagues have argued that the potential use of internal 
Merge in grammatical derivations is inevitable, given the presence of external 
Merge and given the distinction between derivations and the lexicon.17 To quote 
from them: 
 
We believe that Copy is […] conceptually necessary, in the sense of follow-
ing from a very uncontroversial design feature of Universal Grammar. It 
rests on the fact that there is a (virtually unanimously held) distinction 
between the lexicon and the computational system and that words are 
accessed from the lexicon. How does Copy follow from this fact? It is 
universally assumed that the atoms manipulated by the computational 
system come from the lexicon. How does the computational system access 
the lexicon? It does so by copying elements from the lexicon to the 
computational system. That accessing the lexicon involves copying is clear 
from the fact that the lexicon gets no smaller when it is accessed and words 
are obtained for manipulation by the syntax. If this is correct, then 
grammars that distinguish the lexicon from the computational system 
conceptually presuppose an operation like Copy. As virtually every 
approach to grammar assumes something like a distinction between lexicon 
and grammar, Copy is a ‘virtually conceptually necessary’ operation […]. 
(Aoun et al. 2001; cf. Hornstein 2001: 211f.) 
 
Given that “copies are conceptually costless” (Hornstein 2001: 22, n. 10), then the 
presence of external Merge gives us internal Merge for free. Why? Because in-
ternal Merge is Copy combined with (what would otherwise be) external Merge 
as illustrated earlier by the example of what Socrates thought what (Hornstein 
2001). 
 But internal Merge comes for free only as a potential. Internal Merge may 
exist in the system simply as the existence of Copy and the existence of external 
Merge. But this alone would be a matter of competence, not execution. In other 
words, it does not follow that the two would be executed together. The system 
may not be able to execute internal Merge in performance until the procedural 
                                                
    17 Unless there is a rule forbidding internal Merge, but Ockhamist considerations militate 
against supposing so.  
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system has become powerful enough to support a robust derivational memory. 
Hence, while Aoun et al. have made a case for internal Merge in competence, the 
conclusion of their argument is still compatible with there having been an earlier 
period of human existence in which external Merge was in use but without 
internal Merge, due simply to a less developed procedural system.  
 Merge creates hierarchical structures and hence plausibly relies upon 
procedural memory, as do all the thought processes which utilize Merge. Internal 
Merge takes advantage of an especially sophisticated form of procedural memory 
insofar as it requires memory of derivational steps. Given the importance of 
quantifier raising in cognition by description, we can speculate that uniquely 
human procedural memory plays an especially important role in cognition by 
description, and hence in all the cultural achievements which plausibly depend 
upon it: awareness of history, religion, and science. 
 
 
5. The Neuroscience of Procedural Memory 
 
We can make some plausible conjectures about some of the brain mechanisms 
which underpin cognition by description by considering the neuroscience of 
procedural memory. 
 The procedural memory system consists of parallel closed loops between 
the cortex and the basal ganglia (the corticostriatal circuits), and between the 
cortex and cerebellum (the corticocerebellar circuits). The corticostriatal circuits 
consist of parallel and closed loops that project from the cortex to the striatum. 
Subsequently each circuit splits into two kinds of pathways — direct and indirect 
— and projects back to the same region of the cortex from which it originated, via 
the thalamus. The direct pathway projects from the striatum to the globus 
pallidus interna (GPi), and from there to the substantia nigra and from there to 
the thalamus. The indirect pathway in turn projects to the globus pallidus externa 
(GPe), then to the subthalamic nucleus and from there to GPi and then to the 
thalamus. The different basal ganglia-thalamocortical loops project to different 
areas of the cortex (e.g., primary motor cortex, premotor cortex and prefrontal 
cortex) and hence subserve different functions. Indeed, different channels enjoy a 
similar synaptic organization; this indicates that diverse functions served by the 
procedural memory system depend on similar mechanisms. Each channel is 
involved in those functions that are carried out by the cortical area to which it 
projects. The circuits projecting to the primary motor cortex or premotor cortex 
are involved in motor functions, whereas circuits projecting to the prefrontal 
cortex are involved in cognitive functions (for review, see Ullman 2004, Ullman & 
Pierpont 2005). 
 The cerebellum is also considered very important in procedural memory. 
The connections between the cerebellum and the cortex are also mostly parallel 
and functionally segregated. The projections from the cortical areas reach the 
pontine nuclei; from there the neurons project to the cerebellar cortex. The 
projections continue into the deep cerebellar nuclei especially the dentate 
nucleus, and from there to the thalamus and finally again to the cortical area of 
origin (Kelly & Strick 2003, Middleton & Strick 2000, 2001, Ramnani & Miall 2001, 
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Ramnani 2006). The corticocerebellar connections are also organized into parallel 
closed loops. The cerebellum participates in motor learning through sensing and 
correcting ‘motor errors’ — i.e. differences between intended movements and 
those actually performed (Ramnani 2006, Apps & Garwicz 2005). It has been 
suggested that the cortical regions send copies of their original commands to the 
cerebellum (called ‘efference copies’) (for a recent review, see Ramnani 2006).  
 An important feature of the cerebellum is the uniformity of its cellular 
organization and circuitry. Therefore, the cerebellum performs the same 
computations for every function that it serves; the reason for the cerebellum being 
involved in many different functions (including cognitive ones) lies in the 
different cytoarchitectonic organizations of the cortical areas from which it 
receives its inputs (Apps & Garwicz 2005, Ramnani 2006).  
 For a long time it had been supposed that the cerebellum and basal ganglia 
are involved solely in motor control and that they receive inputs from different 
areas of the cortex — including the prefrontal cortex which serves for cognitive 
functions — but send all of their outputs to the motor cortex. However, later 
findings showed that corticostriatal and corticocerebellar circuits also project to 
prefrontal cortex and hence may enter into cognitive functions as well (Leiner et 
al. 1993, Dezmond & Fiez 1998, Middleton & Strick 2001, 2002, Gebhart, Petersen 
& Thach 2002, Kelly & Strick 2003, Ramnani 2006).  
 In a study conducted by Schoenemann and colleagues, it was shown that 
while the amount of gray matter in the prefrontal cortex (the area of the cortex 
serving mainly for cognitive functions) does not differ much between human and 
nonhuman primates, prefrontal white matter differs greatly (Schoenemann et al. 
2005). Gray matter is composed of the cell bodies of neurons, whereas white 
matter is composed of fibers. Moreover, a later study showed that there exists a 
relatively large prefrontal contribution to the corticocerebellar circuitry in 
humans when compared to Macaque monkeys. However, in Macaque monkeys 
the dominant contribution to corticocerebellar circuitry was from the cortical 
motor areas (Ramnani et al. 2006). 
 These findings suggest that there occurred a selective increase in inter-
connectivity between the prefrontal cortex and the basal ganglia and cerebellum 
(i.e. the procedural memory system) in the human lineage, when compared to 
non-human primates. Hence it would be quite plausible to suggest that the 
circuits formerly mainly serving for motor functions (i.e. corticostriatal and 
corticocerebellar circuits, or stated otherwise ‘procedural circuitry’) were 
recruited for cognitive functions in the human lineage. This, in turn, may have 
played an important role in the great computational power of syntax in language 
and, as a consequence, to the qualitatively different computational, and 
ultimately conceptual, powers of the human mind. 
 
 
6. The Potential for Testing 
 
People suffering from Broca’s aphasia, generally understood to be a syntactic 
disorder, exhibit an interesting lack of abstract thought. In his study of Broca’s 
aphasics, Kurt Goldstein distinguishes two attitudes, the abstract and the 
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concrete, observing that those with Broca’s aphasia tend to be limited to the 
latter. 
 
In the concrete attitude we are given over passively and bound to the 
immediate experience of unique objects or situations. Our thinking and 
acting are determined by the immediate claims made by the particular 
aspect of the object or situation. For instance, we act concretely when we 
enter a room in darkness and push the button for light. If, however, we 
desist from pushing the button, reflecting that by pushing the button we 
might awaken someone asleep in the room, then we act abstractively. We 
transcend the immediately given specific aspect of sense impressions, we 
detach ourselves from the latter and consider the situation from a 
conceptual point of view and react accordingly.        (Goldstein 1948: 6) 
 
 Is this lack of abstractness a deficit in cognition by description? Technically 
no, since we defined cognition by description as the ability to think about entities 
or agents that one has never seen. We did not define it as the ability to think 
about states of affairs or situations which one has never perceived. Merge as 
such, by virtue of being productive, makes possible novel mental representations, 
so even external Merge, without internal Merge, could perhaps account for the 
ability to conceive of unperceived situations. The mere presence of a recursive 
procedure as such may be enough to explain abstractive thought, in Goldstein’s 
sense, as a recursive deficit may also suffice to explain a lack thereof. The hypo-
thesis of this paper, by contrast, predicts that defects in the procedural system 
will result in difficulties with grammatical transformations as well as difficulties 
in conceiving of entities (and agents) which have never been perceived. The 
distinction is important to bear in mind while looking for possible evidence.  
 Piattelli–Palmarini & Uriagereka (2005) conjecture that the uniquely homi-
nid mutation of the FOXP2 gene, which plausibly led to a boost in procedural 
memory, made possible transformational grammar (i.e. internal Merge) and 
hence a wide range of uniquely human cognitive abilities. Our hypothesis is 
compatible with theirs, although not identical to it. For one thing, we do not put 
so much weight on FOXP2.18 Perhaps FOXP2 alone accounts for uniquely 
hominid, or even uniquely human, procedural memory, but we are also open to 
roles for other genes as well (Özçelik et al. 2008, Tan et al. 2008, and references). 
Furthermore, Piattelli–Palmarini & Uriagereka do not discuss the relevance of 
Russell to these questions of human evolution. 
 Our hypothesis is testable. Aphasias have already been discussed. Clear 
evidence of an aphasia which disables internal Merge, or even just quantifier 
raising in particular, while leaving cognition by description unimpaired, would 
refute our hypothesis. ‘Clear evidence’, however, is an important qualification, 
because there might be a condition in which internal Merge remains intact but 
                                                
    18 As Piattelli–Palmarini & Uriagereka (2005: 60) write: 
 
As it turns out, it is not crucial that specifically FOXP2 be involved in our 
hypothesis, but since this is the only gene we actually know for sure to be 
implicated in the language system, largely for concreteness we will articulate 
the proposal around it, and in particular the putative ‘permissive’ role of 
FOXP2 in procedural memory. 
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cannot be applied in communication. A general inability to think recursively, or 
even just a general inability to exhibit the computational abilities required for 
transformational grammar, accompanied by unimpaired cognition by description 
would offer a clearer refutation.  
 An interesting potential field of research is to investigate the relation 
between basal ganglia impairment and deficits in cognition by description. There 
is some correlation between advanced stages of schizophrenia, basal ganglia 
dysfunction, and dementia. Since it is late developing, the demented condition is 
sometimes called ‘tardive dementia’ (Breggin 1990) or ‘tardive dysmentia’ 
(Wilson et al. 1983). The condition may be due to schizophrenia being partly a 
basal ganglia disorder (Graybiel 1997), or it may be a result of anti-schizophrenia 
medication damaging the basal ganglia (Breggin 1990, 1993, Dalgalarrondo & 
Gattaz 1994), or both. Either way, we submit that it is worthwhile to look for 
difficulties in the transformational aspects of grammar and impairment in 
cognition by description in individuals with subcortical dementia. 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
Our conclusion is that Bickerton is mistaken in insisting that uniquely human 
conceptual structure, specifically cognition by description, must have evolved 
prior to the evolution of syntax. One can see how the emergence of recursion 
could have suddenly made possible cognition by description along with syntax. 
This is consistent with the hypothesis that Merge ushered in both syntax and 
uniquely human semantics, an hypothesis which Chomsky favors presumably 
because of its simplicity. However, we also leave open the possibility that 
external Merge appeared first, meaning that there was a semi-syntax prior to the 
evolution of full-blown syntax. Specifically, this would have been a phrase-
structure grammar without transformations. It would also have been a 
‘protolanguage’ in some sense, but not the a-grammatic sort of protolanguage 
which Bickerton posited in the earlier quotes. Full-blown syntax, because it 
utilizes internal Merge, could not have been utilized until a fully developed 
procedural memory system was in place. So it is possible that the evolution of the 
memory systems placed a constraint on the evolution of syntax, and hence 
uniquely human semantics as well, including cognition by description.    
 Our discussion has been extremely speculative and exploratory, as we 
noted at the outset. The evidence adduced could, no doubt, be interpreted in 
other ways. But our aim has been to arrive at a possible explanation of uniquely 
human semantics, an explanation which can be tested and will as a result of 
testing, almost certainly, be replaced by something better in time. Our rationale 
for proposing something so tentative is that one must speculate in order to have 
something to test. One cannot rule out hypotheses without having hypotheses in 
the first place. We agree wholeheartedly with Bickerton (2005: 2), when he writes 
that “Speculation is the horse that drags the chariot of theory”. 
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